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Abstract - The rise of virtualisation and cloud computing is 
one of the most significant features of computing in the last 
10 years. However, despite its popularity, there are still a 
number of technical barriers that prevent it from becoming 
the truly ubiquitous service it has the potential to be. Central 
to this are the issues of data security and the lack of trust 
that users have in relying on cloud services to provide the 
foundation of their IT infrastructure. This is a highly complex 
issue, which covers multiple inter-related factors such as 
platform integrity, robust service guarantees, data and 
network security, and many others that have yet to be 
overcome in a meaningful way.  
This paper presents a concept for an innovative integrated 
platform to reinforce the integrity and security of cloud 
services and we apply this in the context of Critical 
Infrastructures to identify the core requirements, 
components and features of this infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction 
The rise of cloud computing is one of the most 
significant developments in modern computing and this 
growth in large distributed systems has made it 
possible to offer processing and storage resources as 
an on-demand service and on a highly scalable basis. 
Many companies are now offering extensive public 
cloud services including Amazon, Google, and 
Microsoft; while Enterprises (and increasingly those in 
the SME scope) are looking to deploy private cloud 
infrastructures based on this model. However, despite 
its massive popularity, there are still a number of 
technical barriers that may prevent Cloud Computing 
from becoming a truly ubiquitous service especially 
where the customer has strict or complex requirements 
over the security of the infrastructure. There are many 
aspects that contribute to this issue but the core areas 
are the lack of guarantees over the following: 
 
 Data lock-in due to proprietary protocols 
 Confidentiality concerns over shared resources 
 Networking bottlenecks in and around core 
datacentres at peak times 
 Loss of governance over mission critical data 
 
Many of these issues stem from the fact that, while 
Cloud Computing had become very popular and even 
essential for day-to-day business, this area of 
computing is still relatively immature and so many 
aspects of the field, including industry-wide 
standardisation, are still in the process of being 
developed. The inescapable fact is that until a sufficient 
level of trust can be associated with moving services to 
the cloud, customers with high security requirements 
will shun these services in favour of a more controlled 
environment. Unfortunately, this covers a wide range 
of potential users, such as security firms, research and 
development groups, and ultimately the areas of 
government and military services but we focus in this 
paper on Critical Infrastructure providers as they 
represent a logical first step in this direction.  
This paper really represents a first step towards 
convergence of the fields of Cloud Computing, Security, 
and Critical Infrastructures as the principles of the 
former are applied to the later (and vice versa) in an 
attempt to sufficiently protect assets deployed in the 
cloud and offer reasonable assurances over the 
performance and reliability of the service.  This paper 
presents a concept for an innovative new platform to 
ensure the integrity of cloud services and identifies the 
core requirements, components, and features of such 
an infrastructure. We will first provide an analysis of 
the current approaches to security in clouds, including 
the emerging field of trusted cloud computing, which 
may make this a more compelling proposition for 
Critical Infrastructure providers.  
Section 2 of this paper describes the state-of-the-art 
in the area of trusted platform computing and its 
application to critical infrastructures. From there, we 
investigate the applications of this work to Cloud 
Computing and explore how such a system could be 
composed. Section 3 of this paper then presents an 
overview of the complex issue of data security in cloud 
platforms, including a discussion of data integrity and 
encryption issues and user access control and 
authentication mechanisms. In section 4, we discuss 
the issue of securing cloud networks and how to 
actively monitor and protect the internal and external 
infrastructure. Finally, in section 5 we draw these 
threads together to present our integrated approach to 
secured cloud services for critical infrastructures. 
 
2. Trusted Computing for Critical 
Infrastructures 
In this section we will describe the state-of-the-art in 
the area of trusted platform computing and its 
application to Critical Infrastructures. We will introduce 
trusted platforms and discuss the advantages and 
challenges of each approach, how it can be applied to 
Cloud Computing, and some of the major approaches 
that have already been put forward.  
 
2.1 Trusted Computing Platforms 
Trusted Computing (TC) is a specialised field of 
trusted systems whereby a device is made to behave in 
a consistent, predictable manner enforced through 
hardware and software techniques such as 
cryptography and automated authentication [1]. The 
main functionality of TC is to verify that only authorised 
code runs on a system and this is an important 
mechanism to help protect critical or sensitive systems. 
On the other hand, authentication is a major security 
addition as it allows clouds to authenticate themselves 
to known machines and provide a higher level of 
service to their users. However, TC is controversial 
because it is possible to restrict or even prevent access 
to protected resources through the stringent security 
measures imposed and therefore has significant 
potential for misuse if compromised [2]. Nevertheless, 
many major hardware and software vendors are now 
incorporating trusted computing elements in their 
offerings and some customers with high security 
requirements, such as the US Department of Defence, 
now require this functionality as part of any tender [3]. 
Trusted Computing encompasses six key technology 
concepts which are required for a fully trusted system 
according to the Trusted Computing Group 
specifications for a Trusted Platform Module (TPM): 
Endorsement keys, Secure input and output, Memory 
curtaining / protected execution, Sealed storage, 
Remote attestation and Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
support. This range of techniques aims to secure the 
system resources; provide guarantees over the 
integrity of running processes, and authenticates the 
validity of communication endpoints for all 
transactions. Moreover, beyond its original prime 
application of Digital Rights Management, TC has also 
now found potential use in a range of uses such as 
distributed firewalls, Distributed Denial of Service 
Attack (DDoS) prevention, and mobile third party 
computing. Figure 1 represents a typical trusted 
platform module. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Trusted Computing Platform 
 
2.2 Critical Infrastructures 
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are a term widely used to 
distinguish services of a serious/sensitive nature such 
that they have the potential to cause massive 
disruption to dependent systems/services if they are 
compromised or destroyed [4]. The services most 
commonly associated with this term are: 
 Energy distribution (electricity, gas and oil) 
 Emergency services (police, fire, hospitals, etc) 
 Security services (military, agencies) 
 Transportation systems (railway, airports, harbours) 
 Public utilities (water, waste, sewage, telecoms) 
 
In the face of increasing threats from terrorism and 
indirect attacks, many governments and security 
agencies are looking at how to effectively protect and 
defend such services. In the UK, the Centre for the 
Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) was 
established in 2007 to provide this service and works 
closely with other agencies to enforce the highest level 
of protection [5]. Typical activities to provide CI 
protection involve; pre-emptive Analysis and 
Assessment, and Remediation, Indication and Warning 
as the event occurs, and Mitigation, Incident Response, 
and Reconstitution post-event as shown in figure 2. 
In recent years, it has been found that an increasingly 
critical aspect of effectively defending CIs is to 
adequately protect their ICT infrastructure as an 
increasing number of attacks are partly or wholly 
conducted remotely through the Internet. One famous 
example was the recent cyber-attack on Iran’s power 
generation systems by the highly modified Stuxnet 
virus [6]. As such, an increasing computing research 
trend is in looking at how to effectively use secure 
mechanisms to protect CIs such as in the recently 
established PROTECT centre [7].  
In this context, many network security mechanisms 
are being used or developed to enhance protection of 
CIs beyond the traditional deployment of firewalls and 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). These include 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), network resilience 
mechanisms, user authentication, Demilitarised Zones 
(DMZs), system and protocol hardening, trusted 
systems, and many others [8]. More recently, the rise 
of Cloud Computing has introduced additional 
complexity to this picture as providers assess how 
customers with strong security requirements can be 
supported.   
  
 
Figure 2 – Typical features of Critical Infrastructure 
protection  
 
2.3 Trusted Cloud Computing 
In the context of CI, the introduction of Trusted 
Computing elements into cloud computing could 
potentially provide several distinct advantages to 
harden the platform. This is still a very immature aspect 
of secure computing but there have already been a 
number of works aimed at designing a trusted cloud 
computing service [9].  
One of the first, most natural, areas where trusted 
cloud computing can be applied is in protecting the 
underlying infrastructure including the datacentres and 
interconnection networks. Obviously, the effective 
deployment of encrypted data storage, memory 
curtaining, and protected execution environments, 
perhaps based on some specialised form of the TPM 
architecture, could make a significant contribution to 
securing cloud resources and isolating them in 
virtualised environments [10]. In addition, techniques 
such as watermarking could be used to protect shared 
modules and limit, or at least effectively detect, 
incursions. Finally, this will need to be combined with 
secure end-to-end networking technologies and trust-
based reputation systems to control access to cloud 
resources. This final element, reputation systems, are 
not typically part of trusted computing systems but can 
be combined with strong identity and access 
management (IAM) to establish trusted network zones 
and enforce role-based access control.  
This approach has received increasing interest in 
recent years as a driver to enable the movement of CIs 
into the cloud. Moreover, this has the advantage of 
potentially being cheaper to implement, as it can be 
based on mass market elements, and is deployed and 
managed entirely by the cloud provider. Ultimately, 
this could lead to the development of a ‘Trusted Layer 
as a Service’ (TLaaS) model whereby the cloud provider 
offers trusted computing features to customers as an 
additional service layer and revenue opportunity. 
 
3. Data Security in Cloud Platforms 
Having looked at trusted platforms, we now put this 
in the broader context of security in Cloud Computing 
and discuss existing mechanisms to ensure data 
integrity, user access control, and overall cloud 
robustness. This section will highlight the current 
challenges in supporting Critical Infrastructures in 
Cloud Computing or other distributed systems. 
 
3.1 Cloud Data Security 
One of the major weaknesses traditionally associated 
with cloud computing is the lack of provision for data 
security and the perception that, by moving to the 
cloud, mission critical data can be exposed to attack. 
This is dependent, to a certain extent, on the form of 
cloud computing that is used and by extension the 
extent to which management is the responsibility of 
the user or the cloud provider but there are well-
proven techniques that can be used to support this. As 
in traditional systems, the most obvious mechanism to 
employ is encryption whereby all data stored in the 
cloud is encrypted using a strong technique such as 
triple DES or AES to prevent unauthorised access. The 
trade-off here is the additional performance hit that is 
incurred during data access and so this is by no means 
universally employed by cloud providers [11]. A 
secondary issue is in attackers gaining access to the 
data through compromising shared resources, i.e. 
through the virtualised hardware, to snoop on active 
data flows within the virtual machine. The final issue to 
consider is the integrity of the data to ensure that 
resources stored in the cloud are not compromised 
and/or altered while in storage. Indeed, some cloud 
providers already implement complex data obfuscation 
mechanisms for this purpose but it is easy to see how 
trusted platforms could be employed to further 
address some or all of these issues [12]. 
 
3.2 Authentication, Authorisation, Accounting and 
User Control 
Even if we can provide reasonable assurances over 
the security and integrity of data stored in the cloud, a 
second major issue to consider is the security of user 
access to these resources to prevent unauthorised use. 
In the absence of strong authentication mechanisms, 
attackers can gain control over resources in the cloud 
and potentially use this to compromise other services. 
Typically, access is provided on an all-or-nothing basis 
such that, once access is granted to the cloud, the user 
has the freedom to do a great deal of (un)intentional 
damage to start and stop virtual servers, or create 
other chaos inside the cloud environment [13]. This is 
obviously a more serious issue when it comes to public, 
hybrid, and community cloud services since private 
clouds will still reside behind existing corporate 
network security measures. However, in all cases it is a 
prime responsibility of the cloud provider to harden the 
service with appropriate Access Identity Mechanisms 
(AIM). Of course, virtual machines or services operated 
in the cloud should still be subject to the same 
hardening as with traditional systems. Again, a range of 
commonly employed techniques can be deployed here 
to enforce access control and authenticated user 
privileges such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) via 
mark-up languages such as SAML or XACML [14].  
In the more extreme case, there is again a strong 
potential to introduce trust-based systems into cloud 
environments to ensure that only trusted individuals 
(and systems) can gain access to cloud resources.   
 
3.3 Robustness 
We next consider the issue of data robustness in the 
context of cloud computing and how distribution and 
replication strategies can affect the security of critical 
data. One of the traditional strengths of cloud 
computing is that data is not necessarily kept in a 
single, fixed location and that this data and any running 
service can migrate between cloud resources and be 
replicated to provide redundancy and resilience in the 
event of attack or failure. However, this issue is also 
not straightforward once one considers CIs as there will 
almost certainly be additional constraints imposed due 
to legal, managerial, or national security concerns of 
data storage. 
Data replication, for example, is one such area where 
Critical Infrastructures introduce additional complexity. 
Of course, it is always a sound strategy to ensure that 
copies of critical data are securely replicated and 
stored in alternative physical locations to ensure that 
attacks/losses are mitigated but, in this case, special 
care must be taken to address legal and security 
concerns. For example, it may be necessary to stipulate 
exactly where data can (or cannot) be replicated to and 
how many copies are made [15]. Indeed, it may be the 
case that the CI disregards automatic replication 
entirely in favour of their own local back-up system. 
Moreover, the location of any CI service run within 
the cloud is a more sensitive issue in this case and 
restrictions may apply over what can be run from 
where. For example, CIs may restrict usable nodes in 
the cloud to ‘friendly’ countries, locations where 
certain legal systems apply, or where certain security 
assurances can be made that the node is trustable, 
certainly in the case of public cloud providers [16].  
Finally, one lesser issue to consider with replication 
and migration is the network security aspect. This is a 
separate issue from securing the actual cloud network 
(see next section) as the networks over which the data 
passes may not be under the cloud provider or CI 
control. As such, special security mechanisms may be 
needed to secure ‘live’ data transfers to prevent 
interception, man-in-the-middle or other forms of 
network attack.  
 
4. Securing the Cloud Network  
The final aspect we consider is to look at network 
security in the context of cloud computing, both with 
regard to datacentre interconnection and virtual 
network integrity and security. Secure network 
connectivity is a vital aspect of supporting CIs moving 
into cloud computing as not only must the connection 
be made secure from attack but special care must be 
taken to prevent connection failures where reliable, 
consistent access to resources is mission critical [17]. In 
this context, we examine existing best-practise in the 
field of network management and how it can be 
applied to Cloud Computing, including encryption 
mechanisms to protect user data, and monitoring and 
IPS services, to secure the network infrastructure. 
 
4.1 Network security approaches 
As in the case of data security, traditional network 
security mechanisms have a strong role to play in 
hardening the cloud infrastructure against attack. This 
section will explore what mechanisms can be deployed 
to secure cloud computing and support CIs. Securing 
the network is clearly a critical aspect of any 
production cloud service and so any public or private 
provider will be expected to implement firewalls, 
monitoring, and other standard management 
mechanisms, to provide a sufficient level of security 
[18]. Moreover, more security-conscious providers may 
implement Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) that can 
determine a range of attack characteristics and resilient 
networking mechanisms to automatically react by 
triggering remedial measures [19]. 
The advantage of a cloud provider hosting a range of 
services is that, as long as the provider implements 
strong security measures, the customers all benefit 
from the underlying strength this provides and focus 
only on securing their own services. The disadvantage 
here of course is that if these measures become 
compromised then all of the customer services are 
potentially also vulnerable.  As such, CI customers may 
require additional levels of isolation from the rest of 
the infrastructure to minimise the chance of their 
networks getting compromised. 
 
4.2 Network data encryption 
Another major aspect of network security will be in 
securing CI data connections both into the cloud and 
within the cloud itself. As such, encryption protocols at 
Layer2 and/or Layer3 will be essential to providing an 
acceptable level of assurance over connection security. 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections are already 
a standard mechanism for providing a secure 
connection both into the cloud networks and, one 
assumes, between data centres. However, due to the 
potential implementation-specific vulnerabilities of TLS 
from certificate mismanagement, man-in-the-middle, 
or XML attacks, other approaches may be necessary 
[20]. The natural alternatives (or additions) here are IP 
Security (IPSec) which provides Layer3 security and, 
Application Layer security protocols such as Secure 
Shell (SSH) as shown in figure 3. IPSec is a particularly 
important mechanism as it offers both encryption and 
authentication, is a core aspect of the upcoming IPv6 
protocol, and is used in Virtual Private Networking 
(VPN) [21]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Layers of secure network protocols 
 
However, it is questionable whether any of these 
approaches alone will offer sufficient security for CIs to 
consider putting critical data in public/hybrid clouds 
and outside of their own private infrastructure unless 
further assurances can be offered over its integrity. As 
such, it may be necessary to consider incorporating 
multiple protocols to offer depth of defence or 
provision dedicated PPP links to fully circumvent the 
public Internet. 
 
4.3 Resilient Networking 
With the cloud infrastructure and its communication 
reasonably secured, the other networking aspect of 
supporting CIs is to ensure that these secure 
connections are both consistent and reliable. In the 
event that CIs move services into the cloud, they will 
require a constant and dependable level of connectivity 
as any disruptions to the service can be both costly and 
seriously affect the CIs performance. There are two 
aspects to this, a) reinforcing the current best-effort IP 
routing mechanisms in the Internet with additional 
redundancy and b) preventing malicious denial of 
service attacks. 
The first case is due to the fundamental properties of 
IP and the Internet as a best effort routing architecture 
which, while mostly reliable, offers no guarantee over 
the end-to-end connection. As such, connections may 
be dropped or even fail to establish due to technical 
faults, heavy load on intervening networks, routing 
errors, or any number of other issues. Clearly this is not 
sufficient where strict requirements exist over 
connectivity so a range of techniques can be employed 
to bolster the reliability of the network. For example, 
QoS mechanisms can be deployed to ensure that 
capacity is not exceeded thereby reducing the risk of 
connections being refused or dropped. Secondly, 
routing redundancy can be employed to ensure that 
there is always more than one route from the customer 
to the cloud thereby guaranteeing connectivity in the 
face of failures. 
In the second case, connectivity to the cloud may be 
threatened by malicious activity, such as through 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as recently used by the 
Anonymous group in response to the arrest of Julian 
Assange in the wikileaks case [22]. DoS attacks attempt 
to overwhelm cloud provider infrastructure by making 
many independent requests to a specific point in the 
network (i.e. a specific web server or router). DoS 
attacks are often made more complex to diagnose and 
overcome by being distributed over many sources in 
the Internet via a botnet or some other mechanism. 
Research into effective countermeasures to detect and 
overcome DDoS attacks is still on going and, as 
evidenced in recent attacks, still not wholly effective.  
 
5. An Integrated Approach to Secured Clouds 
Based on our investigation of these converging 
technologies, we now present our approach to an 
integrated secure cloud platform that aims to embody 
all of the above principles. Our first step is to specify 
the threats and requirements of Critical Infrastructures 
and discuss how we will address this. From there we 
move on to identify the major features and expected 
functionality of the platform. 
 
5.1 Critical Infrastructure Threats 
The threats that CIs face are similar to most corporate 
networks with the exception here that in most cases 
there are more strict requirements over the tolerances 
to faults and attacks. Some of the major threats in this 
case are therefore as follows: 
 
 Hacking attacks 
 DDoS attacks 
 Insider attacks 
 Equipment failures 
 End-to-end issues 
 Espionage 
 Data loss or corruption 
 
These threats may be innocent or malicious but the 
fundamental issue is that the CI provider is denied 
access to its data or services and that its proprietary or 
confidential data falls into the hands of another party. 
Many of these issues are common threats in the 
Internet but extra provisions need to be taken here if CI 
services are to be exposed in the cloud. With this in 
mind, we investigate the core requirements that must 
be met.   
 
5.2 Critical Infrastructure requirements 
The two primary concerns for CIs moving data into 
the cloud will be the security and integrity of the data 
and maximised service availability. While it is highly 
unlikely that CI providers will move mission critical 
services to public clouds, support systems and tertiary 
services can be more easily provisioned. In this context, 
the core requirements are listed below: 
 Real time support: services must continue to 
provide a high degree of availability in the face of 
faults and intermittent connectivity. This requires 
the provider to detail policies and procedures for 
service backup and recovery. Critical infrastructure 
requires even more detailed description of the way 
the data backup is handled by the provider. For 
example, clients may need to know details of how 
removable media are managed and destroyed. This 
is specifically important when the media contains 
sensitive data.  
 Scalability: the service must be able to cope with 
very large volumes of data sources being streamed 
at a variable rate. This requirement appears to be 
quite obvious at first. However, a closer look 
reveals that its implications span over other 
requirements. For example increasing the data 
volume may imply that various services and data 
could be duplicated on the provider’s side. This 
requires guarantees that the data integrity is 
maintained at all times. It also requires that 
appropriate levels of data and service isolation 
should be maintained. 
 Secure infrastructure: the cloud platforms must be 
able to provide reasonable guarantees over the 
security of the data both when it is stored in the 
cloud and when it is in transit. This requires details 
on how data is protected in physical and virtual 
environments over the cloud. Concerns in this 
requirement should include  
i. Definitions of the roles and duties of 
personnel who can access data and perform 
data management tasks. 
ii. Descriptions of the procedures and 
processes used in data monitoring and 
logging. 
iii. The levels of separation and isolation of 
applications, data and virtual network traffic, 
which are applied on the cloud. 
iv.  Details on how data is protected in virtual 
machines. For example details are needed to 
specify how many functions or services are 
hosted in one virtual server. 
 High assurance: the cloud must also demonstrate 
reliability and very high levels of redundancy and 
resilience to minimise downtime. This should 
include details of other how utility programs and 
multi-tenanted applications are provided and 
isolated. A malicious activity carried out by one 
tenant may affect another tenant. This may cause 
the loss of valuable data or service interruption. 
 Minimal costs: the cost of transitioning and 
maintaining the service on the cloud must be 
reduced in contrast to privately resources. 
 Dynamic provisioning: the service must be able to 
react to on-demand performance requirements as 
the processing requirements increase (or decrease) 
over time including spikes and flash crowds. This 
requires descriptions of measures of performance 
and stability of service provision with respect to 
levels of user demands. Cloud platforms should 
also detail how resource usage is controlled and 
optimised using metering capability appropriate to 
the type of service provided. 
 Legal assurances: the customer must be free to 
specify a fine degree of control over the service 
location and data replication strategy employed 
part of the Service Level Agreement (LSA).  This 
requires specifying the level of data protection and 
privacy in compliance with relevant legislations 
and regulation including specifying the jurisdiction 
over the contract terms and data control. 
 
While many of these requirements can be met 
intrinsically in cloud computing, there are several well-
known weaknesses introduced in this approach that 
are potentially critical, especially in the case of CIs. 
Perhaps the most critical of these is the relative lack of 
security and user authentication in typical cloud 
platforms and the limited control and monitoring of 
data replication and service location. Any usage of 
cloud services in this environment would therefore 
require a pre-existing SLA to be in place incorporating 
most of the above elements in addition to the usual 
conditions on overall performance. 
 
5.3 Platform features and expected functionality 
Finally, based on the work described in this paper, we 
will present the key features of our proposed platform 
which will support the migration of CIs to the cloud. 
The platform will be focussed on the provision of extra 
data integrity and security to minimise the risk of 
mission critical services being disrupted or taken down 
by equipment/network failures or attack. This will be 
focussed around 3 key services, Service Planning, End-
to-End security, and Monitoring and Enforcement. 
These features will be presented as a ‘toolbox’ that will 
allow the platform to be adopted and deployed as 
components by a range of cloud providers as shown in 
figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Key features of the proposed architecture 
 
Service Planning 
This aspect of the platform includes the planning and 
negotiation part of the service before the CI moves into 
the cloud. Primarily this will involve negotiating the SLA 
to provide assurances over the customer and cloud 
provider commitments. While most cloud providers will 
enforce some form of SLA with its customers, in the 
case of CIs this will involve extra stipulations and 
requirements. For example, as discussed earlier in this 
paper, CIs will have requirements over the location of 
data and services to trusted parties and enforce the 
legal and political authority it is served under. 
 
End-to-End Security 
The second feature of the platform will be the 
provision of end-to-end security in the form of data 
encryption and obscuring mechanisms and through the 
implementation of trusted computing aspects. This will 
be enforced, both while the data is stored on the server 
and communicated over the network, and will include a 
range of encryption techniques and authentication 
mechanisms to maximise the security of the platform. 
Moreover, the platform will include aspects of trusted 
computing such as memory curtaining, remote 
attestation and trusted third parties to provide 
assurances over the integrity of the service in a secure, 
virtualised TPM system. 
 
Monitoring and Enforcement 
The final feature of the platform is the monitoring 
and enforcement aspect, which will guard against 
attack and ensure that the stipulations of the SLA are 
met. The monitoring infrastructure will need to be 
distributed to provide assurances to both the customer 
and cloud provider that the SLA is being enforced and 
this can also be used to measure the effectiveness of 
the platform. This could for example include some form 
of accounting/auditing model to track the usage of 
applications and services in the cloud and model their 
usage. Moreover, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
will be deployed to secure the cloud against attacks 
and this will be supplemented with resilient networking 
services to counter any recognised attack patterns.  
 
6. Conclusions 
There is a clear need for more demonstrably secure 
cloud platforms to drive the adoption of these services 
among Critical Infrastructure providers. This must 
include mechanisms to secure cloud services, the end-
to-end networking interconnecting the users, and the 
cloud infrastructure itself. We have also shown that 
these issues are now starting to be tackled based on 
existing enterprise-strength technologies and that this 
approach can at least provide a reasonable level of 
assurance over the security of the platform. 
Moreover, a more recent trend is in this area is to 
look towards more powerful cutting-edge mechanisms, 
such as trusted computing and resilient networking 
techniques, to increase the level of security offered and 
bring Cloud Computing towards a more demanding 
customer base such as Critical Infrastructure providers 
and government. 
In this paper we have identified the key aspects of 
this development and highlighted the requirements 
that must be met before this can proceed. In this way, 
we can demonstrate how Cloud Computing and the 
end-to-end networking can reasonably be made secure 
enough to support Critical Infrastructure providers. 
Further, we have proposed an open architecture for CI 
support in clouds and identified the key elements of a 
security ‘toolbox’ that cloud providers can implement 
and deploy to simplify this process.  
This paper represents our first step in this area and 
extensive further work will be necessary to validate our 
approach against CI provider expectations, develop, 
integrate and evaluate the identified functionality, and 
demonstrate the strengths of the platform. 
Nevertheless, the authors are optimistic that the 
advantages of our approach will be self-evident and 
gain traction both within the academic and wider 
research community. 
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